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Abstract 
Turkey, with a population of nearly 74 million and a strategic location opening up 
to Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and East Asian markets, has been one of 
the fastest growing markets in the world in the present day. Having recorded a 
GDP growth with a level of 11% in the first half of 2011, Turkey was regarded to 
have the fastest growing industry in Europe. Turkey’s accession talks have been 
around since 1950s and have been official when Turkey became an associate 
member of the EU in 1963. Although Turkey has made a remarkable progress in 
the last decade, EU still hesitates to accept Turkey’s full time membership. In this 
essay, I have attempted to analyze the possible financial consequences of 
Turkey’s accession into the EU.  
In order to complete a successful study, I have divided the project into four 
sections. In the first section, Summary, I have collected facts from the authorized 
European Union websites and empirical studies towards which my assessment 
will be given in the coming parts of the project. In the Evaluation section I started 
reviewing the facts and the approaches of the member states towards the Turkish 
accession based on these facts, such as positions and perspectives of the relevant 
countries within the EU market and their previous experiences with EU 
enlargements mainly emphasized on the 2007 EU expansion. The next section 
Analysis concentrates on the future based developments and information 
presented in the Evaluation and Summary sections. Therefore, in this section, I 
have attempted to illustrate the foreseen benefits and fears of both sides on 
Turkey’s accession. Finally, in the Conclusion section I present an answer to the 
question “whether Turkey should join the EU or the economic benefits and costs 
should be neglected” from Turkey’s perspective. 
Since Turkey has been regarded as one of the fastest growing economies in G20 
by OECD and IMF, Turkish accession into the EU and its financial implications 
may alter the political, economic and strategic balances of the world in many 
ways; therefore it can be claimed that including Turkey as a member state will not 
only be a hard decision made by the EU on political terms but also it will be a 
decision that will have crucial implications for the world economy.        
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Chapter 1: Summary - Set Up 
 
A Brief History of the EU Enlargements from an Economical Perspective 
The European Union, which is an economic and political union consisting of 27 
independent member states, has been in an expansion process in terms of its 
borders and power since the first day.  Being comprised of only six founding 
states in the 1950s, now having twenty-seven member countries, the union went 
through many processes, treaties and implementations. Yet, I will only focus on 
the ones that are related to the expansion. Starting with the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and (EEC) in 1958, the union has 
grown in size in the following years, with the accession of new countries. After 
signing Euratom Treaty in 1957, the Single European Act in 1987, the Maastricht 
Treaty instituted the European Union under its current tag in 1993. Finally, the 
Treaty of Lisbon was the last adjustment which maintained the constitutional 
basis of the Union.  
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) came into force in 1951, which 
formed the basis of the European Union right after the Second World War with an 
aim of strengthening the steel and the coal sectors and controlling these sectors 
with an authority therein. Belgium, Germany, France, Holland, Luxemburg, and 
Italy, also called as the “inner six”, were the six countries that brought the 
European Coal and Steel Community into existence on April 18, 1951. The main 
purpose of the treaty was to contribute support to the common market for coal and 
steel, to create an economic expansion, to increase employment, and to raise the 
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standard of living. This unification process therefore, had to guarantee a 
systematic supply to the common market by making sure that there was an equal 
access to the sources of production, via setting up the lowest possible prices and 
improving the working conditions in the coal and steel industry.  
Only six years after ECSC, the EEC treaty was signed in Rome in 1957. What 
made the establishment of EEC unique was that it laid the foundations of the 
supranational Europe. Although the first attempt for a unified European group 
was not successful, as the European Defense Community came to a halt in 1954, 
meetings and conferences did not end.  The establishment of EEC supported the 
construction of a common market, common policies, and customs union. As 
stated in the articles of this treaty, the main goal was to institute a common market 
and determine the obstacles the union could face during this process.   
The expansion provided a vital opportunity to the countries that were preparing 
themselves for the 21st century. By offering prosperity and stability to the new 
members’ economies, the union seemed as a promise for a well-integrated 
continent living in peace. Therefore, it can be claimed that the European Union 
has achieved a successful expansion history. The Paris Treaty (1951) establishing 
the European Coal and Steel Community and The Rome Treaty (1957) 
establishing the European Economic Community (ECC) were signed among the 
Inner Six European countries; Belgium, Germany, France, Holland, Luxemburg, 
and Italy. Subsequently, the European Union went through a series of expansion 
processes in terms of both physical and economical means: 
o (1951) ECSC Treaty 
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o (1957) EEC Treaty 
• (1957) Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Holland (Inner 
Six) 
o (1957) Euratom Treaty  
• (1973) Denmark, Ireland and England 
• (1981) Greece 
o (1987) The Single European Act 
• (1986) Portugal, Spain 
o (1992) Maastricht Criteria 
• (1995) Austria, Finland and Sweden 
• (2004) Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic, Poland, Cyprus , 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary  
• (2007) Bulgaria and Romania 
 
The Maastricht Criteria   
The Treaty of Maastricht (formally, the Treaty on European Union, (TEU)) 
was signed on 7 February 1992 by the members of the European 
Community in Maastricht, Holland. The European Commission stated the 
mandatory Economic and Financial conditions to form a common monetary unit.  
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These necessary Economic and Financial conditions can be classified under the 
titles of -the introduction of an independent law that allows the gradual 
independence of central banks and – the macroeconomic criteria: 
• The inflation rates of the lowest performing countries should be no more 
than 1.5 percentage points higher than the average of the three member 
states having the lowest inflations.   
• The ratio of the planned or the actual gross debt of the member countries 
to their gross domestic products should not exceed 3 percent.  
• The ratio of the planned or actual debt stocks to gross domestic products 
should not exceed 60 percent. 
• Every member state was allowed only to exceed the average of the best 
three member states’ long-term interest rates only by 2 points in terms of 
price consistency.  
•  The national currency of the member states, were to remain at “normal” 
fluctuation margin allowed by the European exchange rate mechanism (As 
for now, it is 15%, however most of the countries remain in 2.25 margin).   
By signing the Treaty of Maastricht, the political desires of the 
Community came into prominence, and the community surpassed its 
initial economic objective, which was the creation of a common market.  
As seen from the criteria, the main intentions of the Treaty of Maastricht 
were as follows: 
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1) To reinforce the  independence of the institutions, 
2)  To strengthen the effectiveness of the institutions, 
3) To establish economic and monetary unions, 
4) To expand the Community’s social dimension, 
5) To launch a widespread foreign and security policy 
These policies intended to lift the barriers for the movement of people, goods, 
services, and capital, to preserve common policies on agriculture, trade, and 
regional development, and to ensure stability in justice and home affairs.    
Motives behind the Union 
The combination of various factors contributed to the formation of the European 
Union.  With a quick glance at the European history, we see that Europe hosted 
many kinds of violence that included dictatorships, two world wars, rebellions, 
occupations, and invasions.  Leaving behind the ashes, deaths, and the ruined 
countries after the Second World War, there was a deep longing for the 
establishment of an environment that would allow countries to improve and 
prosper as a unit. In short, due to a heavy reaction against the violence in the 
continent and the desire for peace, the political climate favored a continental unity 
that could maintain the harmony in Europe.  
The aftermath of The Second World War and the gathering round of the allied 
powers’ soldiers in Berlin streets were not long before the breakout of suspicion 
between the allied forces. At the time, Winston Churchill, the prime minister of 
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UK, explained the situation as the increasing distance between eastern and 
western European countries due to the increased Soviet influence over the Eastern 
Europe. The situation then turned into “The Cold War”, a war that was against a 
possible Soviet domination and communism. The Cold War tension ever 
increased starting from the late 1940s to 1960s with regard to the fear of the 
possible expansion of Soviets combined with the drawing of the “iron curtain” 
between the Eastern and Western European countries by the Soviets. Particularly 
after the tension in Cold War reached a climax with the nuclear threats by both 
sides, it became vital for the western European countries to build their shield. This 
common shield, allowed the countries in the western part of Europe to integrate 
themselves into a unit, later to be called as the European Union.  
The political willingness of these countries and their desire for an economic 
development were also two crucial reasons behind the creation of the European 
Union. Following the Second World War, political and economic teamwork for 
restoration of the economies replaced the European economic and political 
competition that preceded the two world wars. Furthermore, there were concrete 
steps towards a cooperation and progress as a unit such as International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and most 
importantly The Marshall Plan. The Organization for European Economic 
Corporation (OEEC), which later on turned into Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), established in an attempt to finance the 
post-world war renovation of Europe, came into existence as a feature of the 
Marshall Plan. 
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In conclusion, reacting against the overall violence and Soviet dominance, Europe 
had a desire for peace, and had the willingness both politically and economically 
to achieve it under a unification process. Consequently, as the motives behind 
were so mature, the formation of the Union should be brought into existence 
without any doubt.  
 
Current Financial Situation of the EU 
 
The current worldwide financial crisis seems as a unique one when the period 
since the Second World War has been taken into account. The Great Depression 
was not only a point of reference, but also it served as a great lesson with respect 
to the policy mistakes done by governments and central banks. When compared to 
the U.S. Government during the Great Depression, European states at the time did 
not opt for protectionism as much, which was an economic policy that controlled 
the trade between states through methods like tariffs on imported goods and 
quotes.  It therefore showed the coordination of the European countries in their 
domestic markets during a crisis.     
In the early phases, the crisis appeared as a clear liquidity deficiency within 
financial institutions as they were having short-term problems.  During this stage, 
the ever-increasing number of people in Europe who could not pay their short-
term debts was regarded as a problem for these financial institutions; however, a 
crisis that would devastate Europe was not foreseen. This view completely 
changed by the collapse of a main investment bank, Lehman Brothers, in 
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September 2008. iNext thing the Europe knows, confidence in the market 
disintegrated, investors liquidated their accounts and stock markets collapsed. 
Subsequently, the EU markets faced the biggest crisis since 1930’s. The real GDP 
of the EU contracted as never before with 4%.  Due to the negligible adjustments 
in the industry and low demand, although there are signs of a recovery, the 
process is expected to be sluggish.  
 
Chapter 2: Evaluation 
 
 
A General Overview of the Turkish Economy 
 
Throughout history, countries such as Ottomans, Romans, and Americans 
achieved to establish property rights, a sense of justice, democratic approach 
towards people, encouragement for technological innovations, liberal reforms and 
a quick re-adaptation period to the fast changing worldwide conditions. The 
nations that achieved these goals faced high macroeconomic growth rates and 
created sustainable welfare that lasted for decades.  As soon as the Ottoman 
Empire was not able to keep up with these pre-requisites of durable economic 
growth, it slowly broke down and the world’s history faced the fall of one of the 
biggest empires in the world. The limited capital resources in order to invest in a 
brighter future slowly melt down due to the weaknesses in the social law. Finally, 
after being defeated in the First World War, Ottoman Empire passed its tradition 
of external debt to the newborn Turkish Republic.          
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Following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the new leadership 
under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk aimed at rebuilding the Turkish economy starting 
from 1923. Initially, the new regime was not interested in the economic or 
financial stability; however, the main concern was hunger and possible 
destruction of public law and order that could damage human capital in return.  
In the early years of the Turkish Republic, although roughly 82% of the 
population was engaged in agriculture, which formed 67% of the national income, 
industry could only provide the essential needs for families that were involved.ii 
There were not more than 220 tractors in the country. However, it was not only 
the domestic problems like the lack of resources that created obstacles for the 
establishment of economic welfare in Turkey but also the global economic 
problems like the crash of the markets in the United States in 1929 stimulated 
this.  The Great Depression in the U.S. boosted the external debt. As soon as 
economies started the process of healing themselves, the social unrest in Europe 
led to the Second World War. Therefore, domestic and international 
circumstances prevented the establishment of strong economic conditions and 
basis in Turkey.       
The 1950s may be considered as the first decade in which Turkey had the 
potential to make a progress financially. However, due to the military coup that 
took place in the following decade, Turkey could not maintain a financial 
stability. Under the dominance of the army, enough capital was hoarded to make a 
smooth transition to financial stability. This time; however, the first and second 
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oil price shocks during the 1970s were the reasons why Turkey borrowed money 
from outside, mainly from Europe.  
Throughout the 1980’s, the policies that aimed to have a trade surplus (by 
exporting more than the import rates) that were designed to lead to a high growth 
appeared to have disadvantages for the economy. These liberalization-based 
policies created a major financial crisis in 1983. However, the economy caught up 
fast and Turkey faced high growth patterns in the following decade as Turgut 
Ozal took hold of the office and extended the liberalization policy. Economic 
liberalization gave birth to another problem: dollarization. Leaving behind a 
traditional regime-directed economy, that was relatively isolated from the exterior 
markets, former Prime Minister then President, Turgut Ozal, started to open up 
the horizon for the expansion of the economy in the 1980s. This paved the road 
for the signing of a customs union with the European Union in 1995. During the 
90s Turkey was undergoing high inflation and boom-and-bust cycles that revealed 
the coming of a severe economic crisis. One of the main international financial 
establishments, IMF (International Monetary Fund) hosted Turkey many times for 
the nation’s external debt problems. Finally, the curtains were closed with a 
bottomless financial collapse in 2001 and the Turkish economy closed the decade 
at its worst.  
 
 
 
Improvement of The Turkish Economy in the last Decade 
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Turkey’s economy started to make a strong progress since the 2001 
downturn due to solid fiscal and monetary policies and financial modifications 
supported by the IMF.  Currently, the Turkish economy has been in a transition 
process from a highly agriculture-dependent and intense industry state to a more 
expanded economy with increasingly embracing large and globalized sectors. The 
Nation’s economy achieved a growth of 6.0% every year from 2002 and 2007, 
achieving one of the highest growth rates in the world. In this five-year period, 
inflation has shrunk; interest rates have fallen to normal levels, the volatile 
currency has become more stable, and Turkey’s major problem, the government 
debt, dropped down to manageable levels (39.5% of the overall GDP in 2008).iii 
However, due to the fast growing economy, the trade deficit increased into 5.6% 
of the overall GP in 2008. As the markets crashed towards the end of 2008, the 
growth naturally contracted to 1.1% while the economy diminished by 4.7%.iv In 
2010, the growth rate improved up to 8.2%, while the government continued to 
implement reforms, adopt a strict fiscal policy, and secure monetary policies of 
the Independent Central Bank (TIB) in order to maintain economic growth and 
stability.  
As stated previously, since 1995 Turkey has been a member state of the 
customs union of the European Union. This association helped to increase the 
trade between Turkey and other EU member states although Turkey maintains its 
large trade deficit tradition. Currently, the European Union is Turkey’s major 
trading partner, despite the fact that Turkey is still delaying to fulfill various 
15 
requirements. The customs union consists of trade in manufactured products 
including the position of Turkey according to the EU policies concerning 
technical regulation of products, competition, and Intellectual Property Law.v        
Pertaining to product groupings, Turkey continues to import technologic 
equipment (automotive products, machinery...) chemicals, iron, and steel 
regularly from the EU as well as agricultural products including cereal. Key 
exports of Turkey to the EU market include textiles and cloth, machinery, 
transport equipment.vi    
At record setting levels of growth, Turkish economy is regarded to ignore 
the financial crisis in Europe fallout although some impacts are felt by Turkey. 
Despite a slowdown warning of European experts in the close future, Turkish 
Deputy Prime Minister, Ali Babacan, claimed that Turkish economy was able to 
dodge the recent impacts of the Eurozone crisis. However since EU is the biggest 
partner of Turkey, and the two sides are linked closely through Customs Union, 
Turkey felt some of the effects as Eurozone tilted towards recession. As Sarp 
Kalkan, a financial analyst at TEPAV stated “Turkish exports to the EU stood at 
56% before the crisis in 2008, but currently they are approximately 47%.” 
Although the overall impact was not quite big, due to a small decrease in Turkish 
exports to the EU and a rapid increase in Turkish exports to Middle East and 
North Africa.        
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Finally, with Turkish economic growth outpacing that of China’s in the 
first half of 2011, Turkish leaders strongly believe that Turkish economy will 
move from 17th biggest economy in the world to top ten by 2023.  
 
Possible Costs of EU memberships to Turkey 
 
For candidate countries, the main purpose of EU membership should be based on 
rational political and economic objectives. A logical approach of a candidate 
country would be to expect greater economic stability and economic convergence 
with the industrialized countries. From an economical perspective, it is totally 
rational to assume that the road to growth will be supported by EU with monetary 
and financial transfers as a result of full time membership. However, there will be 
some costs as well. Every group has its own rules and guidelines that the new-
comers have to follow. This process will therefore be dependent upon the 
availability of resources and investment conditions. So what are the main costs 
that Turkey fears of? 
Besides accepting economic conditions in Copenhagen, implementing the whole 
legal body of acquis communautaire, will not be easy and will have some costs 
particularly for the applicants that are relatively at lower economic levels, which 
is the case for the new EU members or candidates. The never-ending list of 
integration measures noted in the report by the Commission will take many years 
until Turkey adequately adopts the acquis. The EU will be governing the 
implementation process of legal corpus and accordingly, Turkey will have short 
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term economic problems in the areas of agricultural policy, regional policy and 
environmental and social standards.      
Turkey, investing nearly 1.5 billion US $ in Central and Eastern European 
countries, is one of the biggest sources of foreign direct investment in the Balkan 
region. If the EU accepts Turkey as a member, Turkish businesses require 
restructuring and most of the public economic enterprises (SEE’s) would need to 
be privatized and liberalized. This is a major fear faced by the political party 
running the government because the privatization can eventually cause political 
and social tension. This decision would not only be highly criticized by other 
political parties but also by the public.  In addition, during the privatization 
process, the government may run into economic problems such as the allocation 
of money or the amount needed to meet the  price of the enterprise. 
Another point that Turkey has been in fear of, after accessing into the European 
Union, is the potential changes that will take place in its agricultural sector. 
Agriculture is still an essential sector of the Turkish economy. According to the 
European Commission’s Agriculture and Rural development titled article, in 2010 
it represented 10.1% of the total GDP and 24.7% of Turkish employment. Also 
noted by Moustakis, “the most efficient working sector in the country and has a 
compatible high standard in the agricultural world market...”vii Thus, one of the 
biggest fears of Turkey is the import of inefficiency from EU through the CAP 
(Common Agricultural Policy), once Turkey is a full time member. 
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Fears of the EU from Turkish Accession 
This section will try to analyze the main economic concerns and doubts of the 
European Union about the possible Turkish membership within the EU. Turkey’s 
large size, poor macro situation, low contribution to Union’s internal market, 
costly budget implications after membership and migration from Turkey are the 
main fears whereas, low foreign investment to the country and its accession to the 
internal market are thought to have minimal effects on the EU economy as a result 
of a possible Turkish accession into the EU.  
Size 
Many consider Turkey as a weak economy when compared to its large 
population. Turkey is a big; however a poor country, as well. Based on these two 
facts, opponents to Turkish membership believe that Turkey will cost too much 
financially and will have too much power with respect to its population. Although 
size alone will not be the sole ground to make a decision for its future, yet it will 
be a significant and relevant actor in managing Turkish membership. 
According to the critics, Turkish accession would not only have a small positive 
impact on the much larger EU market, but relatively weaker Turkish economy 
would also require financial assistance. Furthermore, at the political level, a weak 
economy with around a population of seventy million would play the second 
biggest role in designing economic policies: how fair would it be in the eyes of 
many Europeans? 
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Table 1 points out UN predictions for Turkey, the EU member states with 
population over 
5 million, and 
total EU 
population from 
2030 to 2050. 
Today, Turkey 
has a population 
of 
approximately 
72 million.  
Until the 
possible 
membership 
date of 2015, Turkey will reach an estimated population of 82 million, likely to 
surpass Germany due to its decreasing population. In 2025, ten years later, Turkey 
will be the largest state in the Union with its population of 87 million. Meanwhile, 
Turkey is not regarded as a European country by most of the Europeans. The 
difference between the largest members of the Union by population such as 
Germany, France, Italy and the UK is that these countries also have the strongest 
economies. Unlike the case of Turkey, political and economic dominance go 
together. 
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 Finally, Turkey has obvious regional variation illustrating the rural/urban 
division with its deprived regions in eastern Anatolia. Income disparity is as much 
as one fifth per head when compared to Turkey’s richest parts, which is Marmara 
region. Dealing with the widespread poverty and regional inequality is Turkey’s 
one of the largest economic challenge.  
Macro Situation 
Although Turkey has a relatively smaller sized economy that would hardly 
damage the internal European market and the Euro, serious financial crises it 
faced in its recent past like the one in 2001 are great examples of financial 
instability. Table three shows the key economic variables of Turkey right after the 
2001 financial collapse. 
Such volatility has been a 
concern especially when it 
comes to accepting a state 
that exhibits weak 
economic patterns. 
Although adopting the 
common currency, Euro, by a country is possible in some years after the 
membership, it is certainly not the EU’s interest to admit a country that has 
financial recessions in its modern history.  As stated in Copenhagen criteria, 
candidate countries are expected to keep up with ever tightening internal market 
regulations and have functioning economies. Economies which are vulnerable to 
regular financial crises do not meet these criteria.  
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Although European’s fear from such adverse effects, it is quite noteworthy that 
Turkey has rebounded from the 2001 crisis in an impressive manner. Since 2010, 
Turkey has the highest real GDP growth rate by 9.0% and 7.5% respectivelyviii.  
European analysts consider this growth as healthy within Turkey’s potential, 
within an evaluation of the ongoing monetary reforms at macro and micro level.  
Another macroeconomic fear Europeans have in their minds in relation to 
Turkey’s accession talks is the inflation. Inflation dropped significantly from 45% 
in 2002 as seen in table 3, to 8.7% in 2010ix. Turkey is one of the few emerging 
economies that had high inflation levels once and managed to stay away from 
hyperinflation.  Although Turkish economy witnessed single digit inflation for the 
first time in thirty years, economic observers believe that it is critical for Turkey 
to preserve the situation and make it sustainable.  
Turkey’s consistency is questioned when it comes to external debt. With almost 
89% of its GDP in 2002, external debt (public and private debt owed to 
nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services) is still an unsolved 
problem on the Turkish side. Turkey’s foreign debt burden is greater than any 
other EU entrants or EU candidate states. Because much of the debts is short-run 
government debt (about 70% being cumulated current account deficits since 1963 
accounting for 40 billion US$) and is expressed in foreign currency, Turkey is 
having a very volatile market, and the Turkish economy is vulnerable to market 
sentiment and exchange rate fluctuationsx. External debt and flight of Turkish 
capital to legal looking financial institutions has been a key feature of its poor 
financial performance in its modern history.    
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In the meantime, Turkey was criticized highly by the European member states 
because of the issues with the IMF. According to most of the EU states, the 
motives that have driven the Turkish reforms are the IMF loans and conditionality 
since the 2001 crisis. Although IMF pushed for monetary cutback and structural 
reforms along with alterations in the banking sector seen particularly crucial to 
diminish risks for additional problems, Turkey did not adopt a successor IMF 
program in 2005 and has declined to work with the IMFxi. Just before Turkey 
started to face high levels of real GDP growth, European observers believed that 
both state and non-state banks needed fundamental reforms. Still today, Turkey is 
being criticized for different problems that it is said to have in its banking system 
and this makes the accession process harder.  
 
Immigration 
Aside from direct financial implications, another feared outcome from a possible 
Turkish accession has been the immigration case. As Jurgen Gerhards and Silke 
Hans interpret the data from Eurobarometer, most EU citizens are confident that 
accession would result in an increased immigration from Turkey to more 
industrialized EU countries. Furthermore, 76.3% of 22,480 EU citizens agreed 
with the idea that “Turkey's accession could risk favoring immigration to more 
developed countries in the EU.” It is regarded as a realistic fear since Turkish 
citizens would have the right to freely travel within the EU following a flexible 
transition period of up to seven years.   
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According to the EU member states Turkish immigration could have adverse 
effects on some specific parts of the labor market due to increased competition. 
Although not every single EU state would be affected to the same extent, specific 
countries attract immigration particularly the ones that are more economically 
advanced like EU-15.  As observed with the 2004 enlargement, by which 10 new 
states joined, migration became a sensitive political and economic issue, in public 
opinion who are strictly against it. Eventually, the EU decided to allow a flexible 
transition period maximum for seven years.  
A second point that the legal immigration could affect the EU labor markets is the 
countries with already high unemployment rates would be worse off since most of 
these immigrants would be looking for jobs along with the citizens of the country 
itself. Although countries that have low unemployment rates may welcome the 
immigration in order to resolve labor shortage problems, since unemployment is a 
lot bigger problem than lack of labor, immigration is therefore  believed to have 
negative economic implications in aggregate.   
Budgetary Implications of Turkish Accession 
Turkey has made a legitimate progress since the last decade with its GDP per 
capita (GDP on a purchasing power parity basis divided by population) 6,200 
US$ in 1999 up to 12,300 US$ in 2010.xii Additionally, its economy grew an 
average of 6.0% per year between 2002 and 2007. During this period, inflation 
along with interest rates dropped while the currency stabilized and the 
government debt decreased to manageable levels (39.5% of GDP in 2008 from 
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73.1% in 2002xiii). However, according to the EU, when considering every 
economic indicator, despite all the recent significant economic developments, 
Turkey would be one of the least economically developed country among the 
Member states, including the groups of countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 
2007 waves. Structural convergence aimed through the catching up of the 
economies is one of the main goals of the EU. Therefore, to balance out these 
economic differences, Turkish accession would be supplemented by transfer 
payments from the EU citizens’ budgets. This is obviously regarded as a negative 
economic implication that arises from the Turkish accession to the European 
Union. Citizens complain from being unemployed already, and therefore do not 
agree on “paying” by accepting Turkey as a member.  
Remembering the negotiations with the 10 new EU member states, not only 
current policy rules, but also traditional politics and intense disputes control the 
budget discussions between the “givers” and “takers” in the EU. Table 4 from 
(Hughes 2004) shows the budget deals done for new member states. The EU 
Council assessed each country’s structural fund requirements and CAP eligibility 
(Common Agricultural Policy) to determine the right amount of payment needed 
for each country. In addition, EU Council limited the structural payments for ten 
states that joined in 2004 to 4% of GDP. Estimates show that funds to Turkey 
vary between 5.6 to 24.6 billion Euros per year, which is nearly equal to those of 
the ten member states in 2004.xiv Therefore, the acceptance of Turkey is feared 
since it is estimated to have the costs of ten EU countries.         
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Although a significant amount of budget transfer is necessary, it is quite difficult 
to estimate the net budgetary implications following the Turkish integration, due 
to uncertainty of the future of the two economies. However, a rational way the 
financial analysts estimate the budgetary implications of Turkish membership is 
to utilize the financial packages the EU provided in the 2004 enlargement. 
Assuming a Turkish membership in 2015, Hughes (2004) expects a 10.5 billion 
euro worth of gross budgetary transfer from EU to Turkey in 2015. Following 
such estimation, according to SPO (2004) Turkey would transfer 4.9 billion euro 
in 2015. As a result, net budgetary transfer from EU to Turkey equals to 5.6 
billion euros (10.5-4.9=5.6), out of EU citizens’ pockets.xv  
Table 4: The EU Financial Perspective for the EU 25 
 Employment 
In addition to macroeconomic affects, Turkish accession may have negative 
implications at the individual level as well. According to Gabel and Palmer 
(1995), market liberalization regarding European integration is likely to have 
negative effects for low skilled workers. For instance, workers with low skilled 
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human capital that have a precarious position in the labor market are on the spot. 
Also confirmed by Hooghe and Marks (2005), EU enlargements bring along 
negative economic consequences for low-skilled people by making them easily 
replaceable with the immigrant workers. This also includes unemployed people 
who are threatened by immigrant workers who have lower expectations and lesser 
demands from their employers, and relatively lower costs of working. Although 
increased immigration does not necessarily risk high skilled workers job positions 
by lowering the prices, low skilled workers of the EU 15 will be highly affected 
due to mass amount of either unemployed or unsatisfied Turkish people who are 
willing to migrate in order to find jobs or improve their working conditions.  
European Integration Consortium (2000) reports similar findings regarding the 
EU fears of free movement in an enlarged European Union. Concentrating on 
Austria and Germany, the EIC believes that based on the empirical knowledge of 
migration impact on labor, the increase of foreigners will affect the wages and 
employment in the host countries. In addition, previously an increase share of 
foreigners in a country by only one percent reduced the wages by 0.25% in 
Austria and 0.65% in Germany while the risk of a person being unemployed 
increased by 0.8% in Austria and 0.2% in Germany.xvi                  
The Customs Union Agreement, Trade and the Internal Market  
 
Turkey and the EU benefit from a deep trade relationship since Turkey and EU 
were linked by a Customs Union agreement in 31 December 1995. As mentioned 
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before in this project, Customs Union agreement does not cover fundamental 
economic areas like agriculture. Therefore the EU has been in an attempt to do a 
cost-benefit analysis of a possible Turkish accession. The EU financial analysts 
believe that economic benefits the EU could collect from bilateral trade from 
Turkey is small-not worth it. In more detail, Turkish exports to the EU account 
only for about 3.3% of the total EU imports (equivalent to €47 billion), while EU 
exported 4.3% of total EU (€53 billion) in 2007xvii. In addition, approximately 
70% of Turkish agricultural exports already go into the internal market of the EU 
without tariffs or any other restrictions. Hence, taking the Customs Union to the 
next level by accepting Turkey as a member is not regarded by the EU as a boost 
to the EU economy through the trade channel.  
Customs Union agreement that was ratified between the EU and Turkey in 1995 
was expected to bring trade and economic benefits to both sides. In addition, 
many observers believed that through this agreement Europeans would be able to 
predict their likely future benefits after a possible Turkish membership, when 
Turkey could access the internal market fully (free movement of people, 
agriculture, and services are excluded in the Customs Union). Unfortunately, the 
European side has been disappointed at the operation of the Customs Union by 
the Turkish side. Although trade barriers were removed, bureaucratic barriers and 
other non-tariff barriers have remained as obstacles for a closer future partnership. 
Until 2005, Customs Union did not lead to any apparent FDI changes as well. 
Starting from 2005 and lasting in 2008 FDI flows to Turkey has dramatically 
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increased from (2.8 billion US $ in 2004 to 10 billion US $ in 2005); however, 
once again the consistency of this rise is doubted by many Europeansxviii.  
Economic implications of Turkish accession into the EU have also been estimated 
by the Netherlands Bureau or Economic Policy Analysisxix.According to the 
Bureau, initially there would be an approximate 34% increase in bilateral trade. 
Then, they estimate the effects of an imaginary Turkish accession in 2010 in 2025 
by using a complete simulation excluding the FDI affects, technology spillovers 
and EU budget transfers. Results illustrate that accession to the internal market 
would generate a 0.8% GDP growth for Turkey, 1.4% rise in consumption and an 
8.1% increase in exports. Turkey benefits most from the textile and clothing. On 
the other hand, the implications on the European side are much smaller when 
compared to a relatively smaller size of the Turkish economy. According to the 
estimations by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the EU 15 
faces an increase of 0.1% in consumption and 0.2% in exports along with a 5.07 
billion US$. As predicted further, as a result of the Turkish accession, the ten 
member states that joined the union in 2004 are expected to face a growth in 
consumption by 0.2% and export volume by 0.3%. In total, according to the 
NBEPA simulations, Turkish influence on the EU GDP is too small to register for 
one decimal place.                   
Turkish accession to the internal market concerns the European Union at the 
policy enforcement level as well. The memberships of central and eastern 
European countries have already transformed the EU from mainly industrial core 
rich countries to a more diverse group which consists of many transitioning 
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countries. Therefore, economic and monetary policies severely change in order to 
maintain internal coherencexx.  This affects the implementation of internal market 
regulations and coordination of countries in achieving specific goals. When 
industrial countries race to increase the level of domination in the market with 
their advanced technologies, transitioning countries must first go through a 
successful convergence process. Therefore the concern is whether a more 
heterogeneous economic group with the accession of Turkey would decrease the 
competition which may harm the EU in return. 
 
The Problem of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
While Turkey began to launch trade policies and started observing its 
exports more carefully (since it has a trade surplus), foreign direct investments 
appeared to be very low. Before 2000, only less than a billion dollars’ worth 
foreign direct investment flew to Turkey. However, since 2000, FDI climbed 
increasingly and mounted in 2007 with 22 billions of dollars then fell down 
during the recent global crisis.xxi       
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As seen from the Figure, the entire amount of the FDI Turkey received 
from 1980up to 2003 was mainly as debt payments or portfolio investments. 
However, from 2003 to 2006 a total of 25.5 US$ foreign investment has flown in 
Turkey. This unpredicted pattern existed until 2008, when the economic crisis hit 
the world. Since 2003, most of the foreign investments to Turkey were from 
Europe. This indicates a remarkable change of perception by the European 
investors towards Turkey. The fact that foreign direct investment increased 
tremendously without the EU membership is a disincentive for the EU countries 
Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) inflows to Turkey in billion current 
US-$, 2000-2009 
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to accept Turkey as a member anymore. In other words, the issue is Turkish 
membership is not expected to change this increasing foreign capital inflow 
significantly and predicted to have minimal positive implications for the EU 
investors and the EU economy in general.   
Table 2.  Citizens' Attitudes towards Different Propositions with Regard to 
Turkey (%)  
  Support N 
1. Turkey's accession would help rejuvenate an ageing European 
population 
36.7% 20,486
2. Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen security in this 
region 
40.6% 21,996
3. Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history 50.3% 22,497
4. Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography 64.7% 23,129
5. The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member 
States are too significant to allow it to join the EU 
68.9% 22,744
6. Turkey's accession could risk favoring immigration to more 
developed countries in the EU 
76.3% 22,480
7. To join the EU, Turkey will have to significantly improve the 
state of its economy 
89.5% 22,574
8. In order to join the EU, Turkey will have to systematically 
respect human rights 
93.6% 23,609
 
Source: Authors' own calculations based on Eurobarometer data.xxii 
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Note: Percentage of those who said ‘tend to agree’ or ‘totally agree’ as opposed to 
those who ‘tend to disagree’ or ‘totally disagree’. ‘Don't know’ responses were 
excluded from the analysis.  
Chapter 3: Analysis 
Positions of Relevant Actors  
Germany 
Germany was among the main proponents of Turkish accession under the SPD 
party led by Gerhard Schroder and demonstrated a new approach to EU-Turkey 
negotiations. However, as the CDU joined the SPD for a coalition government 
following the 2005 elections, position of Germany changed noticeably. The CDU 
has always been one of the biggest adversaries of full time Turkish membership 
for all political, social and economic reasons, while the Chancellor, Angela 
Merkel supported the unique “privileged partnership” with majority of her party 
supporting this idea. In contrast, SPD is still a strong advocate of Turkish 
accession but is criticized by senior figures such as the former Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt. Due to the given uncertainty resulting from the coalition of both parties, 
there is no single strict policy towards Turkish membership and all the options 
remain possible. Among the German population, 12% of the public support the 
Turkish accession whereas 66% are against it. 
France 
During the presidency of Jacques Chirac, the French policy towards Turkish 
accession was somewhat vague. Chirac was in favor of Turkish accession leading 
up to the accession talks; however, faced a large opposition from the right parties. 
Throughout his electoral campaign, the current French president, Nicholas 
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Sarkozy, clearly stated his bitter opposition to Turkey’s accession into the EU 
several times. French public fear and guardianship against a large Turkish 
immigration of workers is the backbone of this strong opposition. Furthermore, 
Sarkozy offered establishing a Mediterranean Union that would include Turkey 
but details were not defined later. 
United Kingdom 
Tony Blair, the former prime minister of the UK was one of the main supporters 
of Turkish membership. Taking the charge after Mr. Blair, Gordon Brown stated 
in numerous occasions that he was supportive of Turkish accession. Since the 
British policy is aligned with that of U.S., it sees this expansion as widening the 
range of EU rather than isolating Turkey from the West. Up to now, the rightist 
parties such as the conservative party are united for pro Turkey enlargement, due 
to UK’s long-established transatlantic alignment. Blair emphasized the 
significance of Turkish membership by visiting Turkey and being the first British 
Prime Minister to visit Turkey in nearly two decades. Brown also got together 
with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in late 2007, and convinced the media on 
the British confidence in Turkey by signing a UK-Turkish strategic alliance 
Agreement.             
Greece 
Greece which was one of the main adversaries of Turkish accession changed its 
position considerably in recent decade. After the continuous pressure from the EU 
and the US and since the 1999 earthquake that struck both countries terribly, 
Greece stepped away from being an ardent adversary to a more somewhat logical 
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observer. Since then, Greece tolerated numerous frustrations regarding Cyprus 
and Aegean F-16 battles; however, sustained its position on Turkish accession. It 
can be claimed that Greek government believes the bilateral problems would be 
solved easier under the roof of the EU. Kostas Karamanlis summarized the 
Athens’ approach on Turkish membership “full compliance, full accession.” 
However, it should be noted that Greek public stance is intensely opposed to EU 
enlargement by Turkey; a recent public poll revealed that 25% supported while 
45% were against it.  
Cases of Romania and Bulgaria 
In this section I will primarily mention how the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (mainly focusing on Bulgaria and Romania) are hitting the ground 
running as they catch up with their European peers. Then I will focus on Bulgaria 
and Romania and discuss some negative implications of their integration within 
the EU. 
Latest EU members, Romania and Bulgaria immediately showed an attempt to 
close the economic gap with the European Union members. Despite the obstacles 
on their way, such as their domestic problems within the states and the global 
financial crisis, healthy investment growth and economic progression make the 
transition a less painful one for these two countries. Being the largest economy in 
the world since the fourth enlargement, European Union accepted Romania and 
Bulgaria who became official members on January 1, 2007. With the fifth and 
latest enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria contributed some 30 million people to 
the EU, increasing the population to almost 500 million people.  
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Romanian and Bulgarian prime ministers have indicated that they are interested in 
accomplishing the remaining tasks identified by the EU Commission. According 
to the monitoring findings, two countries were demanded to intensify their battle 
against corruption and improve their judicial reform procedure.  
Although Romanian and Bulgarian economies vary in terms of their size, 
industrialization levels, and monetary performance, they do have some similar 
macroeconomic 
features. They 
both faced a 
major 
immigration 
from their 
countries in the 
early 90s due to 
economic 
problems after 
the collapse of 
the Soviet 
Union. 
Nowadays, unemployment problem still exists and they both lack high-skilled 
labor in several sectors.                           
Another evidence of convergence of Central and Eastern European Countries 
including Romania and Bulgaria can be found on the Maastricht Convergence 
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Criteria presented in the article European Economy by Fritz Breuss.xxiii The 
changes in these two countries are significant when following their accession to 
the European Internal Market.  In Bulgaria, the Gross debt of general government 
decreased from 18.2 % to 13.8 % of GDP and the budget balance increased from 
0.1 % to 3.3% of GDP. Similar effects can be seen in Romania. Although the 
decreases in budget balance and increases in inflation rate should have been 
exaggerated due to the global crisis, accession to the EU market has diminished 
the negative implications. We have to keep in mind that these two countries have 
prospered in such a short time and currently have not accessed into the European 
Monetary Union yet.    
The latest EU enlargement broadened the single market of the EU as well as the 
Schengen area.  Bulgaria and Romania have not fully integrated into the internal 
market of the EU and they have not fulfilled all the pre-requisites of the Single 
European Market (SEM); however, these two new members benefited evidently 
after their participation in the SEM.    
Furthermore, Romania and Bulgaria extended their trade with their peers. In fact, 
the two new member states started trading with themselves as well. The new 
members also benefited as the former EU members have passed on their trade 
flows to the new member states. According to Breuss (2008)xxiv, the change in 
trade between 1993 and 2007 in Bulgaria and Romania is +7.7 and +24.6 in 
percentage points respectively. Industrialized members of the EU have also 
benefited significantly from the Bulgarian and Romanian EU accessions. If we 
take a look at the following table, we can see that the exports to Bulgaria and 
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Romania have increased tremendously, +7.7% to Bulgaria, and 24.6% to Romania 
respectively. 
 
  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the Central Eastern European 
Countries started trading and receiving foreign direct investment mainly from the 
industrialized European countries. Especially after the latest EU enlargements, the 
CEECs appeared to be a great market for Western European companies. 
Specifically, Austrian businesses and more so German companies whom had a 
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long history within the area exploited this emerging situation. Dutch, Austrian and 
German investors are the most noticeable source of foreign capital inflow for 
CEECs. In particular, Bulgaria and Romania attracted the major share of FDI 
during their integration into the European Single Market as they adopted the 
policy of privatization.  
The global financial state had negative implications on the new member’s 
economies’.  The economic crisis limited the growth potential of new members 
including Bulgaria and Romania. The International Monetary Fund, the OECD 
along with the European Commission has observed downward financial trends 
towards the end of 2008.  
The following table designed by Fritz Breuss in the article An Evaluation of the 
EU’s Fifth Enlargement With special focus on Bulgaria and Romania illustrates 
the effects of integration on the key indicators of each economy. It is clear to see 
that both Bulgaria and Romania benefited from the membership.        
 
 
xxv
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The Case of Bulgaria  
Bitter reforms along with EU support assisted Bulgaria out from the hopeless 
tangle in the 1990s. Today, Bulgarian financial growth doubles the average of 
EU. In 2005, Bulgaria’s real GDP grew at 5.5%, in 2006; this was 6.1% whereas 
the EU-25 growth was 1.7% and 2.8% respectively. Besides investment, 
consumption growth at 6.4% was regarded as the main reason behind the 
economic progress.xxvi Although Bulgaria started to catch up, it still has a long 
way ahead in order to converge fully with rest of its peers. Since the accession, 
the unemployment has also been decreasing steadily. Although unemployment is 
still higher than the EU average, it decreased from 9.3 % in 2006 July to 5.2% in 
November 2008. Following the EU accession, Bulgaria’s most glowing 
accomplishment has been the stabilization of its economy. Investor confidence 
rose rapidly as Bulgaria started to pay attention to the findings of European Union 
Monitoring Mission. Meanwhile, a fast ageing and decreasing population makes it 
harder for unemployment to increase in the youth population. Head of the DG 
ECFIN Unit for economic matters, Peter Grasmann stated that the unemployment 
is estimated to drop below 7% later in 2013xxvii. Additionally, According to EFCN 
autumn forecast evaluations, Bulgaria’s future seems bright as they claimed 
“Economic growth is expected to accelerate further…as strong investment growth 
and ongoing enterprise restructuring continue…”xxviii      However, Bulgaria will 
also have to face the remaining membership challenges such as adopting the 
reforms for euro entry and making sure the Structural Funds provided by the EU 
are used efficiently.    
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By achieving the desired level of stability, Bulgaria is not close to being an elite 
level economy. One of the features of fast growing economies is the ever growing 
trade deficit. Right after the accession, due to the elimination of trade barriers, 
exports from industrialized countries to Bulgaria increased dramatically. In 2008, 
imports were 34.88% of GDP while exports were floating around 22.51%. 
However, unlike Romania, Bulgaria recently started to export more than it 
imports. Since Bulgarian exports grew at a higher pace than imports the trade 
deficit of Bulgaria’s foreign deficit shrank by 64% in January/August 2011xxix.  
     
The Case of Romania 
Romanian economy faced so many ups and downs in the 1990s, and only since 
2000s the economy proved to be more stable. Nowadays, Romania is on the way 
towards the end of a financial rebound. Since 2007, the EU provided Romania 
with a Structural fund worth 20 billion Euros along with an agricultural 
development fund worth 13 billion Euros. These funds were intended to enhance 
infrastructure, improve living standards, increase the competitiveness of 
companies, and therefore create more job opportunities to fight with 
unemployment. Establishment of Customs Union and accession into the EU 
internal Market opened Romanian businesses up to nearly half billion consumers 
without barriers on trade, interest on capital, and limits on travel of labor. In 
addition, due to high level of European market competition, Romanian firms 
reached another level as a result of European market competition.  
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However, despite the EU support, during the following years after the accession, 
Romania could not get the most out of the membership yet. Some negative effects 
are the trade balance worsening, weak competition of Romanian firms, expensive 
agricultural products, and growing of budget deficit.  
Romania’s adoption of the EU Common Customs Tariff and the Generalized 
System of Preferences has generated anxieties regarding the rise of imports and 
therefore worsening of the trade balance. In fact, trade deficit grew since 2006 by 
46%. On numerical terms, the deficit between Romania and non-EU countries 
decreased from 34.43% of the total deficit in 2007 to 29.64% following the 
accession and to 22.78% in 2008. While, the deficit between Romania and the EU 
countries turned out to be approximately 46% after the accessionxxx. Although 
trade deficit with non-EU countries decreased, the trade deficit between Romania 
and the other EU countries increased more than the decrease on the non-European 
side.  
The immediate effects of Romanian accession and implementation of Internal 
Market acquis were negative since further investment was required, domestic 
businesses could not compete with the EU companies, and this in turn caused 
exports to decrease and trade balance to deteriorate. Imports increased 11.2% 
more than exports, resulting in a 44.4% bigger trade deficit compared to 2006. xxxi 
Furthermore, the trade deficit kept rising in 2008 as exports increased only by 
14.37% and imports increased by 10.48% from 2007 (since imports were bigger 
than exports by 5.17%)xxxii.  
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Implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy resulted with increased 
agricultural prices as predicted due to huge agricultural product price difference 
between Romania and EU member states. Therefore, Romania faced 1.5% price 
increase in January 2007. According to Buletin statistic de preturi ianuarie 2008, 
agricultural products were 24% more expensive in January 2008 than in January 
2007xxxiii. Within a short period of time, Romania grew with one of the highest 
rates in Europe.               
 
Conclusion     
Overall, similar to what would happen with Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania 
benefited much more from the EU membership than core countries in the ratio of 
20:1. In the close future, around 2020, Romania and Bulgaria are expected to face 
1.5% GDP growth increase annually on average; however this is still not enough 
to bring Romania and Bulgaria to an elite level of economy. Evaluations reveal 
that new member states Bulgaria and Romania have already been able to benefit 
strikingly as a result of their accession to the internal market of the EU, although 
they have not been fully integrated. In addition, we cannot count out the shadows 
of the international financial crisis on this rapid growth. The question of when 
Romania is going to benefit fully from this accession depends on when it is going 
to get rid of corruption and create a more stable environment that generates 
economic growth. This is the way how Bulgaria prospered and if Turkey joins, it 
is the way how Turkey will benefit: by creating a more stable environment for the 
economy to operate smoothly.   
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Benefits to the EU 
Economic Implications of Homogenization of the Two Economies   
 
How would a potential membership of Turkey affect the European Union? 
Turkey has maintained inward oriented trade and advancement policies since the 
World War II. After the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, the embargo that the 
U.S imposed on the Turkish economy raised doubts in many European’s minds 
about the possible future official economic relationship. Starting from the 1980s 
Turkish economy started to open up with the liberalization of its trade. 
Liberalization of trade not only strengthened its economic cooperation with the 
EU but it also guided the way for the Customs Union agreement in 1995.  
In spite of the economic collaboration between the European Union and Turkey, 
some Europeans are unwilling to accept Turkey as a member of the EU for 
several reasons.      
Turkish membership will affect the economy of the European Union in many 
ways. Migration, agriculture, and integration of trade will be the main advantages 
of Turkish accession to the European Union. My analysis concerning the 
economic implications of the possible Turkish accession to the European Union 
will include three parts: 
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Macroeconomic Effects as a result of Turkey’s accession to the Internal 
Market 
 
xxxiv 
 
 
 
 
Turkey’s accession into the internal market 
Turkish membership in the EU will allow the accession of Turkey into the 
domestic market.  This requires a full adoption of the EU law on the side of 
Turkey. Accomplishing these goals goes through reforms, which may cause 
Turkey to suffer from short run costs. In the long-run however, these reforms may 
well shake the economies of both sides via strong trade relations. Certainly the 
Turkish accession into the internal market will escalate the trade for various 
reasons. First of all, administrative barriers on trade will be lifted or at least be 
diminished to the levels that the EU countries have within each other. This would 
cause less time delays, less formalities and provide many other opportunities at 
the frontier. The formation of a single market due to Turkish accession will also 
eliminate technical barriers on trade as both sides would agree upon technical 
regulations and other guidelines. Although the EU and Turkey got rid of some 
minimum technical requirements through customs union, it is clear that accession 
would help to advance substantially. In addition, risk and uncertainty affiliated 
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with politics and volatility within the economy will be reduced with the accession 
of Turkey into the EU. In particular, political risk and macroeconomic instability 
associated risk will likely be in a declining manner. Based on the estimations, 
mutual trade between Turkey and the EU may increase by nearly 33% as Turkey 
gets integrated within the EU as a member. According to the researchers, textile 
and agriculture products will face the most increase.xxxv 
Potential trade increase following the elimination of non-tariff barriers, revealed a 
cost of non-accession into the internal market. Furthermore, a scenario created by 
Lejour (2008) related with a Turkish accession into the internal market illustrates 
interesting results for both sides. In this scenario, the authors assume that Turkey 
grows with an average of 5% (although it grows with 9% currently), with a GDP 
growth faster than that of EU by 2.5%. Then, the authors assume a removal of 
trade barriers between the EU and Turkey and estimate the effects after twenty 
years. According to the findings, Turkey is estimated to face an annual welfare 
increase of 4.4.US$ and GDP increase by 1%. This is a result of integration into 
the EU market, establishment of a more free trade and specialization. Although 
the results are positive for EU member states, they are trivial in monetary terms, 
whereas Turkish gain is significant. The main cause of the difference in benefit is 
a big portion of Turkish exports flow to EU, while only a small fraction of 
European exports flow to Turkey. Although EU faces an overall welfare gain, the 
Central and Eastern European member states that were accepted in 2004 and 2007 
experience a slight decrease in textile production due to the existence of a more 
competitive environment after Turkish accession into the internal market of EU.                
46 
 
Reforms and the Turkish Institutions 
EU membership requirements and the process of accession into the EU facilitate 
Turkish institutions to reform, and this will eventually affect the Turkish economy 
in various ways. In fact, more efficient institutions and less corruption will 
definitely inspire confidence in Turkey which would encourage more investment 
in and further trade with Turkey. Estimations reveal significant results from the 
improvement of Turkish institutions. For instance, if Turkey becomes as less 
corrupt as Portugal on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index, overall Turkish trade would more than double. This would generate a GDP 
growth of 5.6% in Turkish GDP and welfare increase by 28.2 billion US$. These 
impacts are noticeably bigger than the effects of accession to the internal market. 
Due to deeper bilateral trade relations, EU countries would benefit further as well, 
experiencing a total increase of 8.5 billion US$ in private income, with 
Netherlands benefiting from 7% of it.                      
 
Benefits to the European Union 
As a result of a possible membership, Turkey may increase the size of the Union’s 
market. A bigger market will spur growth and trade, and create job openings. 
Advanced trade integration plays a major role in the Turkish economy. Since the 
ratification of the customs union agreement with the European Union in 1995, 
Turkey is a key trader in the union’s internal market for goods (though not in 
labor market) and adopts significant reforms regardless of its possible 
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membership. Customs union agreement allowed the travel of goods between two 
entities without any customs control. In addition, it was one of the steps towards a 
full Turkish accession into the EU. 1996 and onwards, Turkey and the EU 
established a free trade area for products that were covered by the European Coal 
and Steel Community. Therefore, throughout the recent years, Turkey has proved 
that its integration at the European Union’s economy is at a high level. xxxvi 
Furthermore, the customs union agreement between Turkey and European Union 
led to a creation of a legitimate trade partner, instead of diversion in trade, which 
can be justified by looking at the ever-increasing Turkish share in the EU market.  
The Customs Union already concerns the industrial goods. It suggests that there 
would not be any additional benefits since this agreement cannot go further even 
in the case of a full membership. On the other hand, the issue about getting rid of 
customs duties does not take account of the trade of agricultural products. 
Agricultural products will be excluded of customs obligations only when Turkey 
shall be a full-time member. Turkey’s accession can generate an increasing 
welfare in exchange of various agricultural products in the European Union. 
When the foreign trade of Turkey with the EU is reviewed, Turkey has a trade 
deficit with the EU in industrial goods, and has a surplus when it comes to the 
agricultural products. Turkey’s higher export compared to its import from the EU 
considering the existence of custom duties signifies that Turkey may well 
contribute even more to the European trade under full accession. Therefore, 
Turkish membership may bring full or at least some self-sufficiency to the EU as 
the production of agricultural products that lead Turkish export such as seeds, 
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corn, citric fruits eventually wind up in the market.xxxvii According to the 
Common Agricultural Policy of the EU, self-sufficiency is an essential principle.  
Moreover, in the case of Turkish accession, excess products produced by the EU, 
especially the ones that Turkey lacks, would make Turkey an excellent market. As 
stated by several Turkish market analysts, if Turkey becomes a full-time member 
to the EU, the cream butter production will end since buying it from EU will be 
cheaper due to EU’s vast stock of the product.xxxviii Although agricultural products 
in bilateral trade take up just about 17% in Turkish export and 5% in import, 
European Union would benefit from Turkish membership on the trade of the 
agricultural products.         
Agriculture is still one of the key properties of the Turkish economy. Similar to 
the case other central and eastern European countries, like in the case of Poland 
and Romania, a big bulk of the labor force is engaged in agriculture. Nearly one 
out of three in the workforce is labored under agriculture however, it accounts 
only for 12% of the total GDR. Like in other countries, this sector exhibits a low 
labor productivity performance. Therefore, in the case of Turkish accession, this 
would lead to emigration due to job openingsxxxix An important reason what 
makes Turkey a more realistic candidate compared to other candidate countries is 
Turkey’s trade surplus on the EU agricultural goods. This is because of Turkey’s 
favorable climate, in which it can concentrate in products that the EU countries do 
not slowdown in buying. Not only the EU hinders these products like fruits, 
vegetables and nuts from coming in from Turkey, but also protects them even 
more in contrast to the other central and eastern European countries.  
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In the case of Turkish accession to the European Union, the shield on this sector 
would be lifted, and therefore can create advantages for the EU; for instance 
increasing farm sizes. Since the majority of the exports from Turkey arrive at the 
EU from a small growing sector, productivity of the people in this sector will be 
more important in the future.  xl 
Another benefit Europeans would enjoy is the foreign direct investment to 
Turkey. As pointed out earlier in the section Turkish economy, Turkey has been 
the target of increasing Foreign Direct Investment since 2001. After a possible 
Turkish accession, investors from the EU will have an advantage compared to 
other foreign investors who do not have any privileges. Moreover, Turkish 
membership in the EU would assure the future maintenance of Turkey’s open 
economy policy.       
Immigration 
one of the factors that make Turkey’s accession unique from the previous 
enlargements is its population. Aside from the pessimistic views, in one of the EU 
Commission documents it was noted that a possible mass migration from Turkey 
following a Turkish accession is considered. Although the EU fears the migration 
to cause a serious discomfort in the EU labor market, study results also show that 
“Turkish population dynamics might provide benefits in terms of balancing the 
ageing population in the EU...”xli Furthermore, some EU policy makers and 
financial analysts feed optimistic views concerning the contribution of Turkish 
accession to the EU labor market needs. The EU economy is slowly suffering 
from disappearance of working age population and increasing the elder 
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population. Therefore, Krieger and Maitre (2006) argue that the younger Turkish 
population may well be the antidote for the problematic EU labor markets, 
especially if Turkey can take an advantage of the situation in Europe and use its 
demographic power to educate and train its young population according to the 
current EU market needs.   
Although Europeans fear Turkish migration due to various social, economic and 
political reasons, it is believed to have positive effects on EU fiscal balances as 
well. After a comprehensive Krieger’s (2004) findings reveal that Turkish 
migrants have a better education than those from Central and Eastern European 
members and are likely between the ages 15-39. Brücker (2002) reports that over 
their life cycle, Turkish migrants’ net tax payments (tax payments = social 
security transfer + government expenditures) exhibit positive numbers especially 
if they are between 11 and 48 years of age. A Turkish immigrant contributes 
50,000 Euros on average over his or her lifecycle as long as it fits the descriptions 
above. Moreover, another Swedish analyst Storeseltten, finds similar results 
regarding the net contribution of a Turkish guest worker over his lifetime. 
According to his research, a young working immigrant contributes a net present 
value of US$ 23,500 to Swedish government. 
 Access to Energy 
Compared to aging Europe, Turkey is not only rich in terms of human 
energy but its strategic location also plays a major role concerning the natural 
energy resources. Europe demands more and more energy every single day, and 
according to European Energy and Transport Trends, Europe will demand 160% 
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more natural gas throughout the next thirty years. Currently, Russia plays the 
major role in providing Europe’s natural gas demands. Although Russia supplied 
67% of European gas in 2000, this amount will certainly drop down to lower 
levels, as low as 35% in 2020’s. In this regard, Central Asia, and the Middle East 
will play a more critical role in the necessity for the expansion in energy supply 
sources. Additionally, Europe will also need to diversify the energy transfer paths 
for a safer access to its energy needs. 
Considering this background, it is the essential for Europe to build a closer 
relationship with Turkey, in order to diversify the sources that supply the energy 
and ensure the path of access. Turkey’s location plays a critical role, serving as an 
energy corridor connecting East to West, as well as the North to South, and 
bridging the Middle Eastern and Caspian energy to Europe. In short, Turkey has 
already been an energy center and its significance has been growing as new 
international projects that are critical for the future of the area emerge. 
A project that will have geopolitical consequences would be the 1730 
kilometer-long recently running Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) delivering crude oil 
from Azerbaijan to Ceyhan Port in Turkey, which is capable of transporting 50 
million metric tons per year. It is crucial to note that this project that is bringing 
almost 1 billion barrels per day to Turkey is actually not dependent to OPEC 
countries and Russia.xlii  
After the projects like (BTC) and the pending projects such as Nabucco, which 
will be channeling Caspian natural gas to Europe, it is anticipated that Ceyhan 
port of Turkey will replace Rotterdam in transporting energy resources to 
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international markets.xliii Therefore, as a member state, Turkey would support the 
security of access to energy as well as the diversification supplies once it becomes 
a member state.    
Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
In fact, the reason why the EU delays the accession talks and negotiations with 
Turkey is not due to the economic weakness of Turkey. Convergence of the 
candidate countries’ economies is not a pre-requisite of membership, even if the 
countries have unemployment or regional income disparity problems like Turkey 
does. As considerable amount of evidence shows, economic progress is an 
expected result of honest institutions and sophisticated social capital (as seen from 
the graph below).     
 Correlation between GDP per capita and Quality of Public Institutions  xliv           
 
Further, corrupt institutions and weak social capital of the country will cause 
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integration problems in the EU internal market that is becoming more competitive 
every single day. As indicated earlier in this project, income differences between 
countries disappear very slowly, but they do not serve as an obstacle for 
membership while corrupt institutions constitute major obstacles in terms of 
successful implementation of the EU economic criteria. Concerning the quality of 
institutions, the WEF index considers Turkey to be more advanced than Romania 
and comparable to Bulgaria. However, in the long-term, receiving aids by the EU, 
Turkish institutions can benefit significantly under EU market competition.            
 
The European social welfare form, excessive regulation with massive monetary 
transfers to poorer members has been under constant pressure ever since. It does  
not even encourage the economic progression. However, there is only one case of 
success in which budget transfers were actually useful: Ireland. Besides taking 
advantage from the EU redistribution, Ireland also benefited from the attraction of 
foreign direct investment, implementation from significant tax changes and 
investing in education and technology. 
   
I personally do not believe that the EU should absorb all the third world countries 
and try to make them a better one, as it is not realistic and it does not reflect the 
true goals of the EU. However, Spain at the beginning of the 1970s was not an 
eligible country to join the EU. But Spain has changed tremendously and 
permanently and in today’s union, it is an indispensable member. If the chance is 
given, I have no doubt that so will Turkey. 
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Summary of Capstone Project 
European Union is a unique financial and political partnership composed of 27 
sovereign states who are working together for the benefit of all their citizens. It 
was established following the Second World War, initially aimed at stimulating 
the economic cooperation and tie European countries to one another through 
trade. Therefore, they are economically dependent on each other due to bilateral 
trade. Since then, the EU became a huge single market adopting euro as its 
common currency. As the EU continued to expand, it was necessary for the 
candidate states to fulfill economic and political criteria in order to become a part 
of the union. 
Currently the EU got over the worst days of the Eurozone crisis in general 
and has been facing a mild recession with signs of stabilization. Due to decreasing 
growth momentum and low confidence, the real GDP of the EU is estimated to 
drop by 0.3% in the Eurozone towards the end of 2012. At the same time, besides 
Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Slovenia, the growth is expected to be positive. Therefore, economic convergence 
is still in process; however, is nowhere close to being done. With inflation 
declining only gradually, the EU is cruising through a crisis slowly, but currently 
still in it.     
The longest and still ongoing enlargement negotiation process of the EU is 
the one with Turkey and Turkish accession talks have been around since 1950s. 
Unlike any other EU country, Turkey faced record pace growth levels, surpassing 
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China’s GDP growth in the first quarter of 2011. Decreasing inflation, public debt 
at manageable levels, relatively lower unemployment levels compared to some 
EU countries, Turkish economy wants to prove that it is currently a good fit for 
the EU single market, although there will be some costs for joining the EU. 
Implementing the whole body of law, will cause both economic and political costs 
since the laws will be questioned by other parties and the ruling party will be 
blamed for accepting and implementing some of the laws. In addition, once 
Turkey is accepted as a member state, Turkish business would need to be 
privatized and liberalized. This also can cause issues since so many people would 
be opposed to the idea of privatizing government businesses. Finally, the most 
efficient sector working in Turkey, agriculture would also be affected negatively 
by the policies Turkey would need to adopt. 
Turkish membership talks still continue and Turkey is still not a member 
because the EU has major fears regarding the financial effects following a Turkish 
membership. The EU believes that Turkey is too big of a country and relatively 
too weak of an economy compared to other members. Additionally, the free travel 
of Turkish workers within the EU, especially to the industrialized countries is a 
huge financial concern for the industrialized member states. According to the 
financial analysts, Turkish accession is also regarded to have too much cost in 
terms of money transfers that would be made to Turkey after the accession. 
Besides from the financial implications which are predicted negative, the EU does 
not expect to collect worthy benefits from the bilateral trade between Turkey and 
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the EU. The EU also believes that EU businesses investing in Turkey will not be 
privileged just because Turkey is a member of the EU.   
Although the public opinion of majority of the EU countries is against the 
Turkish accession, it is crucial to consider the positions of some relevant actors. 
Until the presidency of Sarkozy, France was in favor for Turkish accession. 
Similarly, until CDU, led by Angela Merkel, joined SPD to form a coalition 
government in Germany, SPD was in favor for Turkish accession. Greece was an 
ardent opponent of Turkish membership; however, its position changed 
tremendously in the recent years. Although the Greek public opinion is still 
slightly against Turkish accession, the recent Greek governments believe that 
Greece can solve its problems with Turkey though EU enforcement, under EU 
authority. Unlike the other member states, England, under both previous and 
current Prime Ministers, has been concerned with the security issues and wanted 
to expand the EU borders and include Turkey.  
In order to predict the possible financial impacts of Turkish accession, I 
have considered the most recent EU enlargement, the cases of Romania and 
Bulgaria. These two countries had weaker economies compared to the EU average 
and were terribly affected by the financial crisis yet showed signs of convergence 
despite the ongoing economic crisis. The biggest problem of these two countries 
was corruption in the government which held the institutions from running 
smoothly.  This was also a problem for Turkey and is one of the biggest reasons 
why Turkish economy could not transform into an elite level of economy. 
Although these two countries faced a decrease in the GDP growth and 
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employment due to the economic financial crisis, the EU accession decreased the 
negative implications though increased trade and cooperation. Once these two 
counties get rid of corrupt governments with the help of the EU, their growth will 
be sustainable.  
Although EU has fears born out of a suffering from negative financial 
implications from a Turkish accession, EU will be able to collect many benefits 
once Turkey is a member state. First of all, when Turkey becomes an EU member 
and its institutions face EU encouraged reforms, it will definitely attract more 
foreign capital. Besides investment, bilateral trade will also increase since both 
sides would get rid of technical barriers and tariffs on agricultural products. 
Turkish accession will expand the market; create job openings and a market for 
EU products. In particular, excess agricultural products that are sold at a very low 
price would find a market to be sold at higher places. Immigration is a feared 
financial consequence of Turkish accession; however, several simulations point 
out that the EU can benefit from this in a number of ways. Migration of Turkish 
youth within aging Europe and the monetary contribution effect of those 
immigrants over their lifetime to the countries they lived in are expected as 
positive financial implications. Lastly, being an emerging energy port of the 
world, Turkey would be able to provide safer energy access to the EU than 
Russia, who cut of the energy supply for political reasons in the past.   
Although EU would be able to benefit from Turkish accession in many 
ways, Turkey does still not have an elite level economy and has to sustain its 
current growth to become one. The EU should not accept countries that could be 
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damaging its already volatile economy although it did accept countries that were 
not in the level of the member states.  Overall when we look at this possible 
accession from Turkey’s perspective, budget transfers and short-term bilateral 
trade implications are not going to turn Turkey to an industrialized economy. 
However, as seen from many literatures, what lies behind sustained economic 
growth is a government with efficient institutions. EU could encourage Turkey to 
reform and establish less corrupt and therefore more efficient operating 
institutions and this could transform Turkey into a better economy.  
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